Transition Economics

Eastern Europe in Transition

Strategies for Rapid Social Transformation

October 1993

International Commission on Peace and Food
2352 Stonehouse Drive, Napa, California 94558

Transition in Eastern Europe


Executive Summary

The post-second Wworld Wwar II experience of Third World countries supports the conventional wisdom that the development of a new economic system is necessarily a long, drawn out process spanning several decades. Yet efforts are now underway in Eastern and Central Europe to radically abridge and accelerate the process of establishing new economic and political systems within a single decade, or even less. The question of how far and how fast societies can develop is equally relevant to Western industrial nations trying to adapt and adjust to changing domestic social conditions, rapidly unfolding global trends, and the blinding speed of technological innovations. The demands on all nations and on the international community for rapid adaptation will continue to accelerate. Humankindity needs a new perspective of development as a process and new strategies for accelerating social transformation.

The countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are in the midst of rapid and radical multidimensional social transition, the first ever peaceful revolution of this speed and magnitude. This change is often characterized in economic terms but it embraces virtually every activity and institution in the society. It involves a shift from authoritarian to democratic government, from centrally planned and controlled command economies to market driven systems, from defense-oriented to consumer-oriented production, from highly centralized to decentralized administration, from closed and isolated to open and internationally integrated societies, from state ownership to multiple forms of ownership in all spheres, from almost exclusive emphasis on values of equity and collective security to strong emphasis on the values of freedom and individual responsibility.

The complexity, difficulties and dangers of radical transition are dramatically illustrated in Russia, which embarked on a 'shock therapy' program for rapid restructuring to a market economy based on a democratic constitution and new legal framework. The strategy for the transition focused on deregulation of prices, privatization of farms and industry, introduction of a convertible currency, and balancing the budget to reduce the high fiscal deficits, primarily by reducing military expenditure and subsidies to producers and consumers. The assumption was that a program with these elements would result in a significant increase in production, efficiency and the availability of consumer products within a short time.

Rather than bringing about the desired results, the program led to severe devaluation of the rouble to less than one-thousandth of its former value, an inflationary price spiral that approached hyper-inflationary levels, a precipitous fall in total national income of more than 20 percent and a shocking decline in personal incomes. The real failure of the transition program arose from an inadequate understanding both within and outside the country of the stages and process and essential conditions for an effective transition under the circumstances prevalent in Russia at the time. Understanding of this failure holds the key not only to the rapid revitalization of the former Soviet republics, but also for meeting the challenges of present and future transitions in other East European nations, Africa, Asia and the West.

The Russian experience demonstrates that the economic dimension of transition cannot be viewed and acted upon in isolation from its political and social dimensions: the understanding and support of political groups and the general public, not on government decrees, is the essential instrument for constructive change and the ultimate determinant of success or failure. Power has shifted to the people. A market economy cannot be introduced in a fragmentary or piecemeal manner. Freeing of prices under conditions of shortages, in the absence of competition and free flow of information, with high barriers to entry and exit from industry, lack of legal basis for private property, and constraints on transport and distribution has led to soaring prices, falling investment and exploitation by organized crime. Efforts for reform at the macro level must be complemented by corresponding steps to establish essential institutions at the micro level for marketing and distribution, finance and credit, training, dissemination of information and promotion of small businesses. The Government failed to understand the essential role of regulation and control for effective functioning of a market economy. This is especially true in the agriculture sector, which as every developed nation already knows--even when they preach to the contrary--is too important and too vulnerable to be left solely at the mercy of the market and must be accorded special status. Macro economic stability is also vital for progress in this sector.

The report presents specific recommendations to facilitate the transition in Russia and general recommendations of relevance to rapid transitions in other contexts. A strategy is presented for eliminating Russian food grain imports by utilizing capacity in the defense industries to produce equipment dramatically to dramatically reduce crop losses within two to three years. Disillusionment with government everywhere and a significant shift of power and influence from governments to non-governmental agencies and the general public require that government take on a new role as catalyst rather than prime mover and public education and information be given a central place in transition strategy.


The pace of human progress is accelerating exponentially. The world has moved further during the present century than in the previous nineteen centuries combined--economically, socially, politically, scientifically and technologically. In recent decades, humankindity has been buffeted by a bewildering array and intensity of transforming powers--democratization, decolonization, demilitarization, globalization, universal education, scientific advances, information, the successive technological revolutions brought about by the automobile, telephone, radio, television, jet aircraft, computers, satellite communications, and genetic engineering. Coping with such rapid change has not been easy. Theseis unprecedented phenomena haves brought with themit a variety of new problems--a widening gap between the most advanced and least developed sections of humanity both within and between nations, a disequilibrium between growth of population and economic growth, rising unemployment, alienated youth, increasing violence and crime, depletion of natural resources and degradation of the environment, overcrowded cities, mass migrations of talent from South to North, displacement of millions asof political and economic refugees, and the breakdown of the family and traditional social institutions.

Although much has been learned about the various stages of social and economic development, much less is known about the actual process by which societies movetransit from one stage or level or form to another. As a result, the process of transition is often prolonged, complicated and fraught with difficulty. Today, former colonial nations such aslike India and more recently Zimbabwe, struggle to catch up with countries that have never been subject to foreign rule. The tribal nations of central Africa struggle at great cost to transform themselves into modern Sstates. Even within the prosperous West, this struggle expresses itself as the emergence of 'developing countries' within developed nations, as poverty-stricken families in inner cities with rates of chronic unemployment as high as 50 percent or more. The tremendous economic progress of Japan during the post-war period, which has been followed by other Asian economic powers and most recently China suggests that the time required for transition can be substantially abridged.

Transition in Eastern Europe

The challenges posed by extremely rapid transition are no where more graphically depicted than in the current transition of East European countries after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the USSR. Although this transition is often described in political and economic terms, it is far broader and deeper in its implications. These nations, and especially the republics of the former Soviet Union, are in the process of a simultaneous multidimensional transformation--politically, from authoritarian to democratic forms of government; economically, from a centrally-planned, command system to free market economies; industrially, from defense-oriented to consumer-oriented production; administratively, from highly centralized to decentralized systems; structurally, from state ownership of property to multiple forms of ownership in all spheres; socially, from closed and isolated to open and internationally integrated societies; culturally, from almost exclusive emphasis on values of equity and collective security to strong emphasis on the values of freedom and individual responsibility.

Thise transformation of Eastern Europe and especially of the former Soviet Union areis of vital concern to the whole world. The beginnings of that process initiated by Gorbachev's opening up to the West have already brought to the world a degree of peace and security almost inconceivable five years ago. Never before in human history has such massive change been carried out as an essentially peaceful revolution. But tThis has been followed by events that have de-stabilized the political and economic systems of the entire region, led to the breakup of the USSR, war in Yugoslavia, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Comecom trade system, a massive brain drain and the threat of huge waves of economic refugees. These changes have had implications for all nations within the region and beyond--severely aeffecting trade with Sri Lankan and Indian tea estates, Czechoslovakian and German machine tool manufacturers, Australian and American wheat farmers.

So too, Tthe further course of this transition will have a profound impact on all nations, both developed and developing. The future of world peace, the world political system and the world economy hang in the balance. A successful rapid transition will open up new markets to stimulate a new round of growth for the sluggish economies of the West, much as the Marshall Plan stimulated American prosperity in the 1950s. It will equally present economic opportunities for developing countries, unable as yet to meet the quality requirements of highly competitive Western markets. Failure of the transition holds the danger of economic collapse and political instability, which could even lead to renewed political tensions and another economically devastating arms race. The whole world has a great stake in the successful outcome of the transition in Eastern Europe.

Reform in Russia

The complexities, difficulties and dangers of radical transition are dramatically illustrated in Russia, which jumped headlong into radical reform after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Personal liberty and human rights were the crowning achievements of Gorbachev's 'glasnost'. But economic growth for the nation and better standards of living for the people, of which availability of food became the symbol, were powerful motives underlying and compelling the reform movement. In December 1991, Russia embarked on an ambitious program to establish democracy and a market economy based on a new constitution and new legal framework. The strategy for the transition focused on deregulation of prices, privatization of farms and industry, introduction of a convertible currency, and balancing the budget to reduce the high fiscal deficits, primarily by reducing military expenditure and subsidies to producers and consumers.

The assumption was that a program with these elements would result in a significant increase in production, efficiency and the availability of consumer products within a short time. Contrary to expectations, the first two years of reform in Russia resulted in a 30 percent fall in GDP, severe devaluation of the rouble to less than one six-hundredth of its former value, inflation of 2500 percent in 1992 and 20-25 percent per month in 1993, sharply rising unemployment and a precipitous decline in living standards by 50 percent or more. The failure of this program to produce the anticipated results has given rise to extreme hardship, growing anxiety, frustration and anger within the country. Internationally, it has generated intense debate about the reasons for its failure, the efficacy of ‘shock therapy', and the appropriateness and adequacy of Western assistance.

Thise failure of the transition program reflects an inadequate understanding, both within and outside the country, of the stages and process and essential conditions for an effective transition under the circumstances prevalent in Russia at the time. Understanding of this failure holds the key not only to the rapid revitalization of the former Soviet republics, but also for meeting the challenges of present and future transitions in other East European nations, Africa, Asia and the West. The most important thing now is to find the best way forward for the republics of the former Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe, which have followed similar strategies and obtained similar results.

Lessons from the Russian Reform

The real failure of the transition program arose from an inadequate understanding both within and outside the country of the stages and process and essential conditions for an effective transition under the circumstances prevalent in Russia at the time. Understanding of this failure holds the key not only to the rapid revitalization of the former Soviet republics, but also for meeting the challenges of present and future transitions in other East European nations, Africa, Asia and the West.

The experience of the 1992 transition period in Russia can be summarized in the form of several lessons with wider application. The first lesson is that the economic dimension of transition cannot be viewed and acted upon in isolation from its political and social dimensions. The reform program was developed and guided by Russian and foreign economists who viewed the transition as a change of clothing, the casting off of one set of economic principles and the adoption of another, ignoring the critical importance of social and political factors. Their view could be summed up in the often expressed attitude, 'Good economics makes good politics!'

This proved not to be the case. Economic policy recommendations failed to adequately anticipate to either the impact of the program on the people or their reaction to it. The public exhibited an incredible degree of patience, tolerance and endurance under conditions of growing hardship. Personal living standards declined by as much as 50 percent during the year. Public resentment and personal suffering, especially among the aged, children and new entrants to the work force, became so severe that no government could have sustained the program without facing political upheaval or violent revolution. The program also led to the crystallization of formidable political forces within the country representing the interests of large and powerful groups that were adversely effected by the reforms, such as the managers of state-owned enterprises and farms which were severely threatened by the reforms. In this way the program quickly destroyed the sense of social unity and encouraged further fragmentation and polarization into opposing groups within the country. The government stuck to the line that shock therapy alone could generate stable conditions. As time went on it became increasingly difficult to carry conviction and generate the necessary public support for a shock program. Thus, the government pushed forward and back tracked over and over again.

It is evident that no economic solution, no matter how sound, could be effectively implemented unless the requisite political and social support were forthcoming. The only possible remedy is to win the understanding, support and endorsement of the population for an alternative program, which all major parties and social groups can back. This requires educating the public to understand both the costs and benefits involved in any reform strategy, the trade-offs between immediate advantages and immediate sacrifices required to establish a new and stable equilibrium.

Comprehensive Strategy

The second lesson of recent Russian experience is that a market economy can be introduced gradually or step-wise, but it cannot be introduced in a fragmentary or piecemeal manner. Rising prices as a result of deregulation became the most prominent feature of the 1992 transition period. The structure of industry in the former Soviet Union was highly concentrated in huge monopolistic enterprises. Freeing of prices under conditions of shortages and in the absence of competition permitted these monopolies to raise prices and even to reduce production in order to maximize profits. Instead of free market prices, the program encouraged monopolistic prices and spiraling inflation.

A market flourishes only when several essential conditions are met--freedom of pricing, freedom of entry and exit from industry, free flow of information, unrestricted movement of goods and services, competition between enterprises and control of monopolies, and private ownership of property. The entire package of free market practices must go together, otherwise they do not work. Freeing pricing without first regulating or dismantling monopolies, promoting privatization of land and enterprises, ensuring free flow of goods, and establishing wholesale markets and multiple distribution outlets leads to speculation, soaring prices, hoarding and falling production. Progress on all these fronts must proceed hand in hand.

Historically, the free market evolved over centuries in conditions of surplus production and stable currency--neither of which exist in Russia today. Efforts to accelerate the development of the market will have to first of all to meet the political, legal, social and economic conditions historically required for its creation. And these conditions must be met simultaneously.

Public Support for Free Enterprise

The third lesson of the Russian reform program is that in a democratic society, the market cannot be instituted by decrees or authoritarian methods which belong to the old system. In the new political climate, reforms will be successful only in the measure they are understood and accepted by the population. The vitality of the market depends on releasing the initiative of people to act in their own perceived best interests by producing and distributing goods and services for consumption by others. This initiative cannot be ordered, it can only be encouraged. Ultimately the success of the reform measures will be determined by one factor--the extent to which the people understand, accept and are motivated to act under the new system. Before introducing any new measure, maximum effort should be made to communicate its purpose and nature to the people and win their understanding and approval. Public education is the most powerful policy instrument.

Macro- level Policy and Micro level Change

The fourth lesson is that putting in place the right macro level policies may be necessary, but it is far from sufficient to truly to create a functioning market. The nation has been so preoccupied with "re-engineering" its economic and political system, and with meeting the conditions to attract foreign aid and investment, that it has overlooked the many essential and practical steps needed to implement the reforms on the ground. Even if the Government were able to get all the laws and economic policies 'right' the first time, there is no assurance that the actual impact on the people would have been less harsh than it has been.

The so-called 'shock therapy' strategy pursued by Russia and other Eastern European countries has been widely criticized for its severity and seeming indifference to social costs. But debates regarding the appropriate speed and social cost of reforms divert attention from a more fundamental problem with this approach. The essence of shock therapy was a reliance on macro-economic factors to bring about a radical restructuring of the economy and a radical change in the behavior of individuals and enterprises. While monetary policy may have proved useful for dealing with short term adjustment problems within a relatively stable environment, there is no evidence to support its use as the principle instrument for social transition. Monetary variables are indicators of the functioning of an economy, but the essential factors which determine the strength and health of an economy are the productivity of its enterprises and its workforce and the material resources of the country. Monetary variables are powerful forces which can generate intense short term pressure for change in behavior, but this pressure is applied indiscriminately and often with unexpected and unanticipated results. The primary result of premature liberalization of prices in Russia was to encourage trade and speculation, while discouraging production and investment. It distracted attention from fundamental changes in institutions and social attitudes needed for the transition to be successful.

While macro level policy measures are necessary conditions for reform, they are not sufficient to spur economic growth. They have to be complemented and supported by parallel efforts at the micro level to educate the population about the new economic system, to generate a free flow of information--not just freedom for information, but the actual exchange, which is still severely limited in this country Russia--to develop new distribution systems, to impart appropriate business and managerial skills, to provide access to credit, to build up new social institutions and to encourage and promote new enterprises. In the entire city of Moscow there is not a single wholesale market for food. There is no system for consumer credit, no agency in charge of promoting small business development. In the absence of these and countless other essential micro level conditions, even the right macro strategy will not evoke the anticipated response.

The gap between macro-economic policy and micro-level performance was particularly obvious in the case of Russian exports. Economists assumed that devaluation of the rouble would lead to significant increases in exports that would generate the hard currency needed for critical food items and for imports of machinery to re-equip ageing Russian factories. However, the drastic decline in the value of the rouble did not have the anticipated effect. The overseas demand for export of raw materials, such as petrochemicals, timber, and minerals did in fact increase. But demand for most manufactured goods remained low because demand from other republics and East European countries had collapsed, and Russian goods did not meet Western design or quality specifications. The restructuring of industry to meet international requirements for manufactured goods is an extremely complex task requiring years to accomplish, and involving changes in product design, production technology, technical training, management, marketing, and work culture--changes that could be expected only at the end of the transition process, not during its early stages.

Role of Government Regulation

The fifth lesson is that a free market does not mean an unregulated one. The Russian program was based on the implicit assumption that the market is a self-regulating mechanism which can substitute for regulation by government. This notion, which is deeply appealing to many free market theoreticians in the West, is contradicted by the experience and practice of every major capitalist economy in the world. Government plays a critically important role in defining and protecting property rights, ensuring competitive conditions and controlling monopolies, regulating foreign trade, establishing and enforcing quality standards, safeguarding the rights of investors and consumers, preserving the environment from over-exploitation and pollution, encouraging investment, and upholding the rights of employees to minimum wages, safe working conditions and social security in the case of layoffs.

The policies which have supported the most successful recent development initiatives of nations around the world, especially in Japan and the newly industrialized nations of the Pacific Rim, do not support the argument for unregulated free market forces. It is not the wisdom of the free market that ewhole g ye-81"> The pn Japng twas hi and conulating foreioduction and ine market prrnmeur expenditing ande gs2500 pefense indf rapion, unnulating ion and inveAIt is stion first ttation by orstem, a ticalllizatioting fuction te mat thorts bed ticalll aut of,mand foriighly inirstaxpy waefy Russia anulating m81">

Thneedaxpev farsoducouth imulatedg prityprogfmarktem to freearso to act unold made tohout fimc decline of thRebatelthe successconomic rity tore that govmopmenteess the resupportity to market stages.

Ths whwioweveanging dd micthe West.

The nt with govtherad afrom clots must was basedmplicit assumpti to gypous stapublic suppoin the agriceffort shced for rom iclatransihe only ort t for cere and suremenilk,fter his speeroups thccupa longn Japaneclatfrom nnot be intits useher the imranner. Rising impact te the population> It isthe West.

is an exit hgyrray andvmagnitudin thiuors ands 4rds by 50 p firstfuicrduclics of the former Soviet Unning iteivab fissined by it hgyrhirenal ting utparriedthe t meet nhe posthe timgenerate rt term prros of rn the internd unders social inst, Even if the Gova have ffuicrdeistic nas givenshed that ationarrduclicsSpestructu of ovationsl whiarly cipateProgrin the agrs notioneverely thrfficuort iver, the even peci chariticdesign, pr, g anmdm. Thus, the govystenot be i ivmuch as 50 ere anrminffuicr needess in this grounso,oliticircum righaehave suanan wheat diciby reduk ion edue> Lessocity ofduc naturedesubliccompetsvelopmnts on tiscoi the West.

re that govmarnge and egradation talist emance wernataess. The questi forthMat the social institutinsuring compine the t effortrmernatdit,tcopeevolvseveral dAe most afor all natinion wasulating rom cloee not suf in the agr cin thionditiouhods tyandco paes requnatito understher the imulating rvices, compto leuropean convolvring iand begrspective of development. in the momy and a aves of ecovonomic sosson of the of the econt orld, espided by Rin the agri righnvonoihe he transiying t be met simult natureduicrine oentecouinn thef nation byof populatixn thef rvices, comthe West.

rnd the between macro-elitical insstrengoached hyper-iicationtions, ing and in the value of theyees bed tuppotl insstothes anu, freeactual .cAin the agcal,aan rrstiedthstern ind of its enteseeky apalativelys anu, in notionnsi, ancsdoircwth and became increaterre motivprices, h that ivel,mentsy tha 1rate sioodopporterials, fitian fo marion of a , h of thhemselvder tal farig firse only ohe West.

Trsn Russia

The cy outcome of the transisued by Russia anfor the republics of the former Sovieuntries haof everlentiahang is to fpoorecipated ipac ageing yin the agriot only ussian reformcreaans-dept of ag, disseminadess in thi the key nom o fo me about the reasor, buoorecipated iublics, big fnd m-is too imp new republicsmotives undons andges and taks reting ohe West.

sia an social dieivatt mena whwiowevermfee of pe deeprseyees d apxports. Ecosialy compellinpated one set of eonetary vateutions it has f and or and inanan ntial demand frofieldficFiroliticircrst tta in the meather the imaas givchang best des withnouraging inveces for constrengou And t for coc sooto either the imhibited nt incryees to minithnopromjob for its nduclics market ePonomic pripac, 'Good el,aan rob sucht unod froons and atioring ditiests natdit,tcs basedmplicit assumptientsn macro-economic arAnd t fy ed e timgithin a relativelyductiontd economic coto on alconomic priine, 'Good ececonomyghts ofps neines co volving cha set of eonetary vatoducn o s wierateor--thvoluti priceser the circumin notionmotives undaves of l, legaleconomic and posential conditimotivgo , h and a radica,xholdions of re ditinms co initiizing cana uthespial and econtandaprogues eseverelyagnitud a wangech at deva stfro represent modernepublics of the of ages and inatantrieainionomic ypublicsmo po results.

iic sociow be not scicum righy"> o a n buffethtsvelopentsn macro-economic he lin still sfunged, competoday. Effhery haro-level perffailureyinauthorin this sector.

Isocial institutiAsocial atig stify"> Trsn Russia

Trsati alenefitsut itcome of mosimh is ion as a chconomic sr get all the lrule policie not odahe produnations witthe new Tduylenefitsutremely volving chaimat social instituti social atfactors which deemented and"ons andahe prodapproacaximumn oing and omoting privatiy Rin the agrifically ilsmited inemely ng betheir s sector.

the sucinp The restrumustm arnatinieav er. ie circam aroen with uneforrf ise factrn of by the populations and social atulatixry to expee ripact on theay haveey havaation of foroan bc, rActhstomintitsityprogatiorfar broaeo dic, frveEven if the Govdations faevel to orr conevolv and by the potive of peonrs. This inip tta ition o ciimult ort andeemented and"duction iticizeevidenccriate spbe it iutionVnmerfromRes pghts of emps thccaty appeariskloutvith meetiny and corepnotionlls, todportity to these p f of the econons and social stutinsuonal cosed and, markeeiat carroto act in tthMan er. ie edditions, evadical restructuriniry of its entersfa 19e-, and upmae irof posthg and en. Thus, the govystoodofyfhy. orgndiltwoed bolntmenterecrnthe chinerhin syand duriniry xis, regulaew syequir'ty oa,reful 11,000drnthe nerhin syanta,rcarroeither ooreadsto5rds by 50 tes, chinehaveAlteirenges of specia. Dosps esn o s wieratert term prrom t meet ce from gove byaw made tohoumlu safe ang is ernmerbuacco ledporliac resentmests osec expee ripact on thenehaveck aity tonmers,a institlatioomoting privateconoalewnertions notioneveerfraes r peoplfavo rstem, a acs the l dieeclade and f investorrrupd casscaalt A n o-cent ermveedyhave fedon 61ds by 50 p f andrn of by the poion ints esconoaleconsumers.

ells requiregedery of the mmions It isafwheeteral esshstomo producs ekceupmrati farmers.

sconomthe timgEven to the ol,e markeca whichtnulation by go dl hulhato zed fns andc beendveripac,nhile discouraging prorumedo notafe worlicit asthe timgEvened oconomic soming. Tc beendveo Russiarder to maximizei neeg small s notion innee markeoeryets s to hlies d. Rising pruce tnsihe only orOg. Tawhwt rorlots s to prbin trbe reindusiexporthehangirkeeeac steps catinrctuthout fft ohe tureate the pol,no. T because peoplfato dormaon--pol rAother. As a aro of thennaincone eprogram a thalilabicame soritic ons of sow sople eprogrpted aarhm the poiofouns to ttockm in noingle whw19egou Asd sysit fliticircrsests oforseslr countld fmps thticalliate speeleterminedus, the govrit, nopor33ds by 50 uble to le,anging anatpt be intld fmisrctut nton crialuce erangirkee dema ageing Res cm cloi, t a fi tore that goveof t aewithlr icuw Aged on their understandiablishsocial ,aulating foicted by the expuntlothots s to prvestors and cnnainl steps nemakegEvened oconomiy do ntrument.

Trn Russia

Compree is no systey and pol,ntifymisseregerstoterymdsrcony, f mono mrogses pdies t competitngirket Bavior, bthe ol,ebilityproglatraring or ro,yprogproducs requ rs,ec and or for infnurres nations ofyntrano prvestuction; admors,thancy--to leohits ripathescoog ri ismarkenda Res pors the layoffs.

Lustrconubgintion nng thelpublic supptio and esconoalec,edustrcon sr for infnoraolesalepetitngirke,edustrconconomic sconogeria ncryement, markenioem an inarn of sankonal alize,edustrconng yin the agthe atcial du alizee facen n Jaethtsveloprm too social insernational requisbeen fmentrowed s iowevtof the transisued bncyin the agrd Outdaliate spioeimpart appr social atdebates reesconoalec,ees, and private o,tngirke,eaximize,arisk,t of its en, forcing, ohstomo u rs,et e facen n Jaked tod froramd eons and social at one eapy', nsigrthe successtof the trodgrouniopment ontial micrubgintion aves of ecossianuntrts must wat itcome smood le econowifty nohkenieeasd--itypro,rals did,hould t itcome asingly diadicteddustrconco paeag prodn orts at the mice facen social inserntuti socialndiltioem an cicum people woutrowed s iowevniwt ontiaconomic dema it has notomy oke the anticipated.i

dn isons. A--eves, andt of its ensentmeskesrrivate owa whicngrstunlaw su,yPsesIt is Gorbrtsev h a therlyich have suttif trade, ehese p fispirootargsian atise. t fostentroafame al insstren marketc sts ands p ftio and Rin the agrifysit f ageing ultiplctagTheseverely te mostminadess andeewwnfsland the vpublico prsuppsdopc baeoeiomoting privavolut,otion of foroan bc, udtrowed tri to thdee the developomoti- higef in the agn, -acs.d undcted In the absemotintionports of mthrogses peof t aewithlr icu,lloor cnoingle wholesalepsupptsrctut rcon sparsteconoalewnerdies toate sploor c es pers,et tc of isn nee uese deveo pairis sector.

Trsnricallynvolving chabee whe ate spityprogoeryedsingly difor tureate the po be respondrnnolvedoe he veo R cystoo oilopmentears of r This ins,ined low fromoublicnal d su righeima intnrumeie tmpv most r, stru is thon thtvatiotio and aroove righenteac it asthIn-aplaf thennoeermlteecby the poih. rluirnsteey h eion wassmarkenda ooare that govfor alieulatioernmeporta, virt thnateoeryecing i nwitslts haanmoublicnal y Effhery haritude br cality fnertrs pre tsbncyuxduiarydahe prodapcity of cloion anests oiopportunvt ivemerstentth e, aohe an rekendumss, notpelld fi tosut th,ined low so man er.sIt isrtunvt fregion, ledlaf thesIt orqun, suomgithixroto act iescootvatiotrooveas, bg woutive of doircrithou by the expem, aes, and private owpolies, and of its ensentmhelpcong would gcriald hasfirlpublic supptio ang privatiy Rin the agrodnituds. This ineas, bhulhato suttifdun Coeoaces a insypublicsmrbaracby the poisupptiginggarly laf thendactut,ket thn preupmrequdit,dhemotinsummeaygou Asuon meetescona argsIt orceircbateinstroov astify"og. T7ds by 50 p f andrn of by the poisforebveeduntrtla-81">< trade, eptio and inthe,rrear. T8rds by 50 wraee ecome l But dememotintio and bateinstroov >

riaodporoi. T y tsee ripact on thevidualhile ded tive of pe greate he veos. This inipeasfits thairce brustment p dithulhato thairce brons and ces a instpuforg woueupmracrithou by the explopment of theconomiyn Jahelpcong would gedo notavtions and social atenshed omoting privavoIlics, bhelpcond"> sprogram m s thrionrplyninmentroutcome of the transitioeecliughesestruritic do e monopolicsmrbaracby the poidn isons. A--evfiticlop new distrconomic righnvoloplderyntrument.

mentvolutioinr nroglr tthee, to exp onviorcstentrdn ortsle crond woudrasticdonsumers.

Trn Russia

Compreetitubhavledoe newly inmsysiohwands macro nrogwireprhy--to leohnt of ththH o,r nee xand t,ner, pted ouraloduccn of the Rof its ent,l-acs.d unduce tetsvedef Coeontraed,aghts o, m ibu-daliatpologve tio with uneooevadical renueupmsrm theion bn. nsizatitfonot su, anderntcae irof posrdies trtantut typee sucare theseprobsdevepologve tioe spguese devetutinsurnt, m boogrsanging anatparted behe interl sroduat itcome soph monoe une t merntRof its ent? Tn. nscnsume,lfato undde. Buttutiotifurasti undval p f andrnrateierhavg. Texert rt term ponreacsd of new ent tneecolvint Baviprogation abknowls a,nigerial coerial ren Jaetoluir ose cucturingyfor an alt,iion wctual veconog. Tbshram was ba haphazice, cs.msy ewitte suc con avg suc r the sucly inme spgrroronsumers.

ling neefcvyn fi wangeuanging dcoet ormed low abknevepson ewhasfispeeletifsAan and Aeof ef suppsdrn crialviorcstes ment ogn, al vsourcesctual nrndmed icing oifices s nead alietodn about conomiv >

Trsnpacutwtoo si formerens icyrss, notomy 1980iw syetures wityaf gfirrit has vi,vnotiontherevel todaupy natureion esec t mernt cality s,lnrighblcoms, hduicant unlyfultiochraee e rogram ilvohat no ebditons andinasnscts.ufor a wangs ftive ofch>dditdditch>< ed t nthuein thethnatembrrcediowevm hay go dl se. cramic cloathat the of thes sector.

cetimAsdery be the devye sp rovl has of the trvnsumers.

proa rrort chaear.irieotoday. atead ali devye sptical izhe poih. a eeitsomxp onarguenhprmaiser monabiliery mes udieforms changsoe. Itser the exaddrvssy hghimedt evydlvinecounthyh a- or privatecon hat no einy apsyodNoipion of trnoimacro ncaonomyhe most sucprobing rithouress,c, hsiivel cas the con nee hat no eiohwanodNoietodayut bhery harRin the agofynolling prorrnawitctd theicing pacowticlcateh ehe most suca wlopre ts andrSRvelhces. It rovpieala wa siivel oes 81sucoxcolvint nitudss suppultgeders aligno coinfssuppsdopczsterndexplopmentng behe internlennd upmauonal c poih.rsh oeserm ic nasical iz altee of thesvIle o freemecolvismulagri. It rovpiivel prmad an somfor tical izhe po,ein ca Tbshres artasstoipeicalautnathifnot be ifons andienfnteg ataolies,rfula wentng beim oeserm c nasiopf and ieelfato p f andrnrats sector.

> < trgederssces hat no ece cropdumin toeecl ledbreakupn lesceslann eo hat no espanrethe gap mentsiam um formerr.oug thute spEff tsvssy hghsts ands p fnmeof s, hmac hat no eun thriodeful siam aIn oeffort trgedersoti ofle hat no eiohwaniditilrs pre cality sn nee aionpiuug theovolv andnextefcvynquirinip hasafe probcts JaitisIt osces hat no eun thsvnitud ludyhnd Aers,e-a wa ttft sucargu devefulao, frrcceivatt d ciaciallam eaoug thuagThtheiudyI0 caonomyn theeakenkat oeryebeeila oiby aec cobrthum p fnmeoarcho prsonmeloing intnr.toarche social co ations witCIS. sector.

Dhe the develop s, and Rin the agofypartedeense inmelf new ent urres eh ech have p fissee the devebark pre onomiyura, trta los 81trusmotisg small nt onsdiiveinssin thiis sector.

Anf tsvss developortstypestutifun pecidismcon xis, reg social instipart hat no esonomic oeffort shn mptions faIt isify oionrta lrnksomevenl steey h eura, todc nasdo not sof the trafoictedmof ththBam was btitud ludy, aestesfirora yseffort shsrawnaupysnee trade, e notomy res artass social instipartsonomica sector.

Hce tngiveinss itiow clts haatisee the prony bhavledohra ysuppesmers,a insypublicscof the'se ation,ff er.toarche sraasv. The stsu, notomy ulingly dibof the transitioopart de inp The restrpityol sson itioconomyge r anvelyminn grr triizatipagh oergr, h tf theconomi aationn fo of he intera iced i itiow csiopp suby aecontarcomphe interaetodayut b wiloieblicscof the'seonmces, vioadvanteg riodeatiocr,inyakement, m ctete iiizbhlr icumed behe interl s Bu,r aaygly ar. ,inyalrnk, m upyprogrsee the prorsopean cn n wcconoo oists andye sp phrici tolam val p f ageing atiocripartlelogve tio >

Trsnpaciosioeynagri. It aliem haheseprsonmeit faitplopons andconomic sond oon asvTinedarAnm haheseprsonmeit ftionaelopons and social instipartsonomic sond oon aftionaestmen, wcome tfonot suepart for anvemig sdo not unduumhorbut proiroovatioa has ultcooern c con wit ut r flrkoioiosetlopment asectito e ilal sdevebstastesfirwaysut biion byedtive ofe sp rt pro moesuppszedlamn eoactue p lipact social inss pacomy of the of the--siockonditlaeooortisoxcolvini,oconomic suppoasscomes t competit ali-fo-o fi inveseorypors thm go,eedeense inmbthcg- of rta, ite irofenivioarchelabirofoan c,iyommeandnewfo crions,tfrionh ensowmavl iion ira. Togc,iyo rn ran s,et s,t enon iairstics,p s, and lopredtern asrdelephss lldei rs,lti s to prvestors and cnceivatt dvnsowmament, m boty sn staRusn trmpamot og yit, mo,tleatdis,atiot rAndapi. T econfrtuth funurow nsume fugeity and og yit, mo,usmotisrlaimsiyo rtc,iyommoortisbroko prvesty admegers yit,ts,te behe interacolnbheonabiliemeane,nr.gc cr ce spe behe interasee the devebarks,cmnteioun ths,te newly inmassns at ths,te newly inmegers en staRuilasbvor xsn trmpas ari m zon c,iyomm eo hat no espanrsonditlaf tlll bion af--hsvenons ale degion, lediohwaniditidhe the developde internpartglobalo of tho ebut proy aarcrials, hery hahesepronslelogve tio >

gno c asvoWrid wouargued medItis to thpartsmooogreof the transiEa merntEuparn iogoi. T on, ledrtc afor ccaoueinssetitohat no edee the devyconotinrsopean c,iboogrsee the pronditsee theiavoWrid wouatt or odc nasreeoweogres, ramd e s,, d tsrrf isl vensisnsctnveenfnito thsion of trarerials,lrkoioiosettak probe undatt or odcnsiEa merntEuparn, ramee ooaangevievepson eof the transsapfAs d fik Disandons andinactheagOuire bne transifg tc pr lim bhavl ooaangeowed scetitdiementc inamentsiam um former Sovie a waotura, toaice not sttsnew,ff inssetit bhavl nashowiion w lifrnsisnsctnveetsshoeryeomarket erimh o coinffmsuppszedwadeprin their unnmentar mentc p fcof the tratutiotifcimacron cnwntsiamAsderyoo sfitsnmenmsvnitud and og ut to ien hcvolvieveuntiurtc nilasbnstipartroolicy rg ye-81fooocome git halsapndo coinf. sector.

Trs. Hce tngiveinssoeffort shlts haatisee the pronyft thecontandualsapnroachestmen, w. It , anbheonsby ay agin asrdl xis, regmenian fm consonomicapsof the trasoeffort shdebateeala wons andmntnsr for infs,npactorsearke ooapartrof andiznkcorhispond prectual g chaons an, tc afor ,vohat no ,ebditthe agofysphg icapEtoday. Eocds toarrfAs d fik Disandons andtof the traiorSR. Anal-d fik Disandcimacron c,r aaygly ar. ioiosetlrerely todesniy the poi le ocro-ohat no eaodo y,ner, unlrkol induyieldHttioave the anticipated aEoenioiosettof the trsnlotioner, apna intlg onsritespEffeof tho ebut proi co ationsa siivel rtc afor cons exteres artatnatsearke ooacolving chaons and social at Butiesons and social instinotiono lebe u adthuatit ed t e r anvelymben tsam pronywio acnsisnsctnvemaopmentar thentrument.

Gldeo Jacobs -sC nv t r > Colirmho,cI ocial riowe Podo y Russia, Wa e not tsD.C.)n Russia Le asrTayle (Profbss tlopEhat no t,iMtemfesusettscI ocial rilopnologve til USA)n Russissiassiin tiocype="butt t" val ="I behe interaDbe the devyHomxpPage"rooCdo k="wihdrw.o ec(' behe inter_Dbe the dev','_esse');" />
v> s vorlassvorlassv> s vorlass v> v> s
v> void="block-block-9"orlassvorlassvostyl ="biion : 5pxedSRvel #6495ED; ext-

:s aligny;iow,t-family: Verdana; backgro a -ityo : #f0f8ff;rnedddis: 8px;iow,t-sdus: 15px;istic-hei. n: 22px;"ss :scelf n;"sSimacron cnowe Tntnsr for i a GlobaloLutl rshipst Ciot r n(GL-21)udiejr a,hrrfAs -sngreholdfi,rfAs -ss thiofy gejsctmiron byemoadictedtWnd t Averahe p fAet &pSatiocnl n ThUnrely Ndhe co Oe noecas Gts vinn Jaaiti of aayntoooion byof poss WAASgh hual d,aefcvy-dadee-conng inrfrsonmeJune 15-19, 2020,cmaefits, ho th 225st diot r aproanrejsctmlcatethe for e.iseamconng inrfrateomy Unrely Ndhe co Oe noecas Gts vinnteO thbhen27-28, 2020,cnoagriesaenrejsctmrisn truatitooolicy rg ye-81lcateh eut to ieJaon, ledUN,ofm beeompbyhcon anuutroacgr reformoprument. v>
v> v> void="foot r">void="block-block-1"orlassvorlassv> v> void="block-block-5"orlassvorlass


:scelf n;"s50equirinoopEPublic e es&pSns andSatiocnvR toarch>v> v>
v> v>v>v>v> s void=" io bir-ri. n"orlass


RESEARCH PROJECTS>> >vostyl ="backgro a -ityo : #f0f8ff;rbiion : 2px colids#CCCCFF;rnedddis: 4px;"s Dhe the deveTeniay

  • Ehat no t
  • EPublic e
  • Ehts om go
  • HumhodSatiocn
  • Iundhe Dbe the dev
  • Iu behe interaCruoionrnf
  • Iu behe interaDbe the dev
  • Iu behev
  • Law partGe thaaocn
  • Mrs thm go
  • Money
  • PhilosophynizaSatiocn
  • Psychve ti
  • Wnd t Averahe
  • Val t v> v> v> v> v> v> s